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INCOMMENSURABLE USES: RLUIPA’S EQUAL 
TERMS PROVISION AND EXCLUSIONARY 
ZONING IN RIVER OF LIFE KINGDOM 
MINISTRIES V. VILLAGE OF HAZEL CREST 
Abstract: On July 2, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest held that the 
“equal terms” provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act requires a comparison of religious and secular land uses with 
respect to an accepted zoning criteria. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit 
confronted a circuit split in the application of the equal terms provision 
and carved out a compromise between competing concerns about con-
trol over land-use regulations. This Comment discusses the difficulty of 
equal treatment within the context of exclusionary zoning and argues 
that River of Life puts control over zoning regulations into the courts and 
out of the hands of religious institutions. 
Introduction 
 In 2010, President Obama sparked controversy when he asserted 
the right of Muslims to equal treatment under the law in his comments 
on the Ground Zero mosque.1 This controversy illustrates how equality 
in the context of religious freedom is a polarizing concept in the realm 
of public opinion.2 The U.S. Courts of Appeal have been forced to con-
front this controversy head-on when applying the “equal terms” provi-
sion of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA).3 The equal terms provision prohibits the government from 
imposing land-use regulations that treat religious institutions “on less 
than equal terms” than nonreligious institutions.4 During RLUIPA’s ten-
year history, courts have adopted different tests to the equal terms pro-
vision.5 In 2010, in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 
                                                                                                                      
1 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Backs Islam Center Near 9/11 Site, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 
2010, at A1. 
2 See id. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006); see infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the Tenth Anniversary of the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 13 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf. 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that the ap-
propriate solution to this problem was to carve out a compromise be-
tween religious institutions, municipalities, the federal government, and 
the courts for control over land-use regulations.6 As a result, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the denial of Village of Hazel Crest’s motion for a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the zoning regulation.7 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the background and holding of 
River of Life.8 Part II then traces the relationship between different con-
structions of the equal terms provision and the modes of control over 
land-use regulation.9 Part II then explores the Seventh Circuit’s efforts 
to strike a compromise with its “accepted zoning criteria” test.10 Finally, 
Part III argues that River of Life demonstrates how equal treatment with-
in the context of exclusionary zoning is in fact impossible.11 In effect, 
River of Life puts control over zoning regulations into the courts and out 
of the hands of religious institutions.12 
I. Divergent Applications of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision 
and the Seventh Circuit’s Search for a Compromise 
 The River of Life Kingdom Ministries is a small church that occu-
pies a warehouse in Chicago Heights, Illinois.13 In 2007, the church 
wanted to relocate to a building in the nearby Village of Hazel Crest.14 
That building, however, was in an area designated by the town’s zoning 
ordinance as a commercial district.15 The zoning ordinance had been 
amended to exclude new non-commercial uses so the district around 
the train station could be revitalized as a commercial center.16 The or-
dinance therefore excluded churches and other non-commercial insti-
tutions like community centers, schools, and art galleries.17 
                                                                                                                      
6 See 611 F.3d 367, 368–71 (7th Cir. 2010). 
7 Id. at 374. 
8 See infra notes 13–52 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 78–90 and accompanying text. This Comment uses the term “exclu-
sionary zoning” to refer to the practice of zoning areas for certain uses to the exclusion of 
others. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 372 (quoting People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, 
Inc. v. Morton Grove, 157 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1959)). 
12 See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
13 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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 On February 15, 2008, the River of Life Kingdom Ministries sued 
the Village of Hazel Crest under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision and 
moved for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the zon-
ing ordinance.18 The district judge denied the motion, and a panel of 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the church was un-
likely to prevail when the case was fully litigated.19 The Seventh Circuit 
then granted a rehearing en banc due to a disagreement among the 
circuits as to the proper test for applying the equal terms provision.20 It 
ultimately created its own “accepted zoning criteria” test that compro-
mised between religious institutions, municipalities, the federal gov-
ernment, and the courts for control over land-use regulations.21 
A. RLUIPA and the Circuit Split 
 RLUIPA is the latest chapter in a long struggle between the courts, 
the federal government, and municipalities over religious liberty.22 In 
River of Life, the Seventh Circuit had to determine the proper standard 
for applying RLUIPA’s equal terms provision to the church’s petition.23 
The equal terms provision states that “no government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious as-
sembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious as-
sembly or institution.”24 The circuit courts have struggled to apply the 
equal terms provision and have disagreed on two points: (1) how to 
compare religious institutions to secular ones, and (2) the level of scru-
tiny to apply for instances of unequal treatment.25 
 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the majority in River of Life, ex-
amined the different approaches the Third and Eleventh Circuits have 
                                                                                                                      
18 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, No. 08C0950, 2008 WL 
4865568, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008), aff’d in part, 585 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2009), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, and aff’d, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010). 
19 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 368–71. 
22 See 146 Cong. Rec. 16,702 (2000) (statement of Sen. Reid); Sarah Keeton Campbell, 
Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 Duke L.J. 1071, 1073–74 (2009); Anthony 
Lazzaro Minervini, Comment, Freedom From Religion: RLUIPA, Religious Freedom, and Repre-
sentative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 571, 572–602 (2010) (discussing RLUIPA’s 
history and the application of the equal terms provision). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006); River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368. 
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
25 Campbell, supra note 22, at 1074, 1085–86. This Comment only briefly addresses the 
debate over the level of scrutiny; it instead focuses on the methods by which courts com-
pare religious institutions to secular institutions. See infra notes 53–77 and accompanying 
text. 
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taken to the equal terms provision.26 In 2007, the Third Circuit decided 
in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch that “a 
regulation will violate the Equal Terms provision only if it treats reli-
gious assemblies or institutions less well than secular assemblies or insti-
tutions that are similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose.”27 The Sev-
enth Circuit understood this approach to require a court considering 
whether the equal terms provision has been violated to first identify the 
regulatory purpose of the ordinance at issue and then to compare the 
religious assembly to secular assemblies in light of the regulatory pur-
pose.28 A zoning ordinance violates the equal terms provision if the 
secular assembly and religious assembly do not differ in any way “mate-
rial to the regulatory purpose” but the ordinance nevertheless treats 
the religious institution worse than the secular institution.29 The Third 
Circuit decided that a regulation that disfavors a religious institution in 
such a way should be subject to a strict liability analysis rather than a 
strict scrutiny analysis.30 
 Unlike the Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit simply compares the 
religious assembly to a similarly situated secular assembly, defined as a 
group gathered for a common purpose.31 A regulation that would per-
mit a secular assembly to locate in a district must permit a similarly situ-
ated church to do so as well.32 For example, in 2004, in Midrash Sephardi, 
Inc. v. Surfside, the Eleventh Circuit held that private clubs are assemblies 
that are similarly situated to churches and synagogues.33 Also unlike the 
Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit decided that any unequal treatment 
of religious institutions will be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis rather 
than a strict liability analysis.34 
                                                                                                                      
26 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368–69. 
27 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit also noted that “there is no need 
. . . for the religious institution to show that there exists a secular comparator that per-
forms the same functions.” Id. 
28 611 F.3d at 368–69. 
29 Id. at 369; Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266. 
30 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 269. 
31 See, e.g., Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 
F.3d 1295, 1308–11 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 
(11th Cir. 2005); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230–31 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
32 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. 
33 366 F.3d at 1231. 
34 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369 (citing Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1232). 
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B. The “Accepted Zoning Criteria” Test 
 Although the Seventh Circuit in River of Life acknowledged that the 
different tests used by the Eleventh and Third Circuits may yield similar 
or identical results, it declined to follow either approach.35 First, it de-
cided that the Eleventh Circuit’s broad understanding of the term “as-
sembly” would allow for comparisons of incommensurable uses of 
land.36 It reasoned that equality “signifies not equivalence or identity 
but proper relation to relevant concerns.”37 Second, it decided that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test “may be too friendly to religious land uses” and 
thus may violate the Establishment Clause.38 Third, it expressed con-
cern that the Third Circuit’s application of the equal terms provision 
would allow self-serving zoning officials to disguise systematic discrimi-
nation of religious institutions under the veil of a “regulatory pur-
ose
ion” —that is, the over-protection of 
lig
                                                                                                                     
p .”39 
 Given these perceived shortcomings, the Seventh Circuit forged its 
own course and held that the proper application of RLUIPA’s equal 
terms provision is the “accepted zoning criteria” test: “If a church and a 
community center, though different in many respects, do not differ with 
respect to any accepted zoning criterion, then an ordinance that allows 
one and forbids the other denies equality and violates the equal terms 
provision.”40 The Seventh Circuit decided not to apply strict scrutiny to 
a discriminatory ordinance because it perceived such analysis to lack 
textual basis to only have been used by the Eleventh’s Circuit “to solve a 
problem of the court’s own creat
re ious institutions.41 
 In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s followed the Third Circuit’s narrow 
reading of “assembly” but modified the test by shifting the focus from 
 
d. at 370–71. 
n Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City 
of N 6 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
rom a jurisdiction.” See id. at 374 
(citi 00cc(a)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) (2006)). 
35 See i
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 371. 
38 Id. at 370 (citing Saints Constantine & Hele
ew Berlin, 39
39 Id. at 371. 
40 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
41 See id. at 370–71. The Seventh Circuit limited the holding to the application of 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision and raised three other protections against religious dis-
crimination: (1) courts must apply strict scrutiny to a land-use regulation “that imposes a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a . . . religious assembly or institution”; (2) 
“no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that dis-
criminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomi-
nation”; or (3) that “totally excludes religious assemblies f
ng 42 U.S.C. § 20
76 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
regulatory purpose to regulatory criteria.42 Thus, the outcome would 
not depend on subjective, and potentially self-serving, testimony by lo-
cal officials.43 Rather, by focusing on regulatory criteria, the test shifted 
the interpretive standard from a subjective one—looking into the in-
tent behind a zoning ordinance—to an objective one, to be deter-
in
 by a church can be the basis for its exclusion 
erion, and the ordinance treated religious and secular uses 
the same.52 
                                                                                                                     
m ed by federal judges who apply the accepted criteria.44 
 The concurrence and dissent in River of Life raised a number of 
criticisms to the majority approach.45 Judge Ann Claire Williams con-
curred in the judgment but argued that the “regulatory purpose” ap-
proach is still the best approach for three reasons: (1) it is simpler than 
having judges decipher the accepted zoning criteria; (2) judges will 
look to regulatory purposes for guidance anyways; and (3) zoning offi-
cials could still couch discriminatory zoning policies in terms of ac-
cepted criteria.46 Judge Diane S. Sykes dissented, arguing that the use 
of an accepted criterion such as “tax-enhancement” would always allow 
zoning officials to exclude religious land uses from commercial, indus-
trial, and business districts.47 Furthermore, traffic control and other 
criteria would force religious institutions out of residential areas, leav-
ing religious institutions with nowhere to go.48 For example, the in-
crease in traffic generated
from a residential area.49 
 Nevertheless, the majority denied River of Life Kingdom Minis-
tries’ motion for an injunction against the zoning ordinance because it 
decided that the church was would be unable to prove the ordinance 
violated the equal terms provision of the RLUIPA.50 The court held 
that generating municipal tax revenue is a concern of land-use regula-
tion.51 Therefore, the creation of a commercial district is an accepted 
zoning crit
 
42 See id. at 371. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 371. 
45 See, e.g., id. at 376–77 (Williams, J., concurring); id. at 377–92 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
46 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 376–77 (Williams, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 386 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Scholars have likewise criticized the tax-enhancement 
rationale to a zoning ordinance because its practical effect is to allow for widespread opposi-
tion to the exercise of religion. See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 755, 762 (1999). 
48 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 386 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
49 Laycock, supra note 47, at 774–75 (citations omitted). 
50 Id. at 373 (majority opinion). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
2011 River of Life and RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision 77 
II. Balancing Competing Concerns over Land-Use Regulations 
A. The Equal Terms Provision and Control over Land-Use Regulations 
 The varying constructions of the equal terms provision53 reveal 
different schemes of control over land-use regulations.54 On the one 
hand, the Third Circuit’s regulatory purpose test limits the power of 
religious institutions to challenge local zoning ordinances.55 The Third 
Circuit’s view is that the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the equal 
terms provision gives too much power to religious institutions, which 
contradicts Congress’s intent to deny religious institutions blanket im-
munity from land-use regulations.56 The Seventh Circuit in River of Life 
echoes the concern that the Eleventh Circuit’s test may disproportion-
ately favor religious institutions.57 Thus, the Third and Seventh Circuits 
proposed tests that curb the power of religious institutions.58 
 On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the intent of 
Congress to achieve a different result—to provide religious institutions 
with the power to challenge zoning regulations.59 In 2004, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Midrash Shepardi, Inc. v. Surfside concluded that RLUIPA does 
not define “assembly” or “institution,” and the court therefore opted to 
define these terms in accordance with their dictionary definitions.60 
The court further looked to the intent of the legislators who expressed 
                                                                                                                      
53 Compare Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
268 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that plaintiffs suing under the equal terms provision must 
identify the objectives of the regulation), with Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 
366 F.3d 1214, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the terms “assembly” or “institu-
tion” should be construed according to their natural meanings for the purposes of finding 
a violation of the equal terms provision). 
54 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 268; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230, 1231 & n.14. 
55 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 268. 
56 See id. (“[The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of RLUIPA] would lead to the conclusion 
that Congress intended to force local governments to give any and all religious entities a 
free pass to locate wherever any secular institution or assembly is allowed.”); see also 146 
Cong. Rec. 16,700 (2000). 
57 611 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2010). A related, more general, argument against RLUIPA 
is that local governments may be better able to balance the interests of secular and religious 
institutions in a given community. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and 
the Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1846 (2004). By having a federal regu-
lation, however, religion may be seen as a class for favored treatment across local and state 
boundaries. Id. 
58 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse Institute, 510 F.3d at 268. 
59 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1231 n.14. Although Judge Posner criticized the use 
of a strict scrutiny analysis, the Eleventh Circuit’s application of strict scrutiny may very 
well be a way to balance the interests of municipalities and religious institutions. See River of 
Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1231–32. 
60 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. 
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the need to protect churches and other religious institutions from un-
fair zoning ordinances.61 In this way, the Eleventh Circuit followed an 
originalist construction of the equal terms provision to empower reli-
gious institutions against discriminatory zoning practices.62 
B. Imaginative Reconstruction: The Balancing Act 
 The Seventh Circuit’s “accepted zoning criteria” test articulated in 
River of Life responded to concerns over the balance of power between 
the courts, municipalities, and religious institutions raised by both the 
Third and Eleventh Circuits’ tests.63 On the one hand, the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s test answered the concern that RLUIPA unduly limits municipal 
regulation and favors religious institutions.64 On the other hand, the 
test also aimed to limit the role of “self-serving testimony by zoning of-
ficials and hired expert witnesses.”65 Thus, the test also advances the 
aims of RLUIPA by protecting religious institutions from unfair zoning 
ordinances.66 
 This imaginative reconstruction of the equal terms provision re-
flects a balancing act in deciding who controls land-use regulations.67 
Judge Posner’s reluctance to adhere strictly to RLUIPA’s terms may re-
flect a more balanced application of congressional intent than an 
originalist or strict construction of the statute.68 Indeed, Senators 
                                                                                                                      
61 See id. at 1231 n.14 (“Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they 
permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for 
secular purposes.”) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. 16,698 (2000)); Minervini, supra note 22, at 
582–84 (discussing the history, congressional intent, and application of RLUIPA). Scholars 
have confirmed these concerns through surveys conducted in Illinois. See Laycock, supra 
note 47, at 761 n.16 (citations omitted). 
62 See, e.g., Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 
F.3d 1295, 1308–11 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 
(11th Cir. 2005); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. 
63 See 611 F.3d at 370–71. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. at 371. 
66 See id. 
67 See id; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817–21 (1983). According to the practice of “imaginative recon-
struction,” Judge Posner explains: 
The judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the en-
acting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute ap-
plied to the case at bar. . . . To construe a statute strictly is to limit its scope 
and its life span. . . . The letter killeth but the spirit giveth life. 
Id. 
68 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371; 146 Cong. Rec. 16,700 (2000); Posner, supra note 
67, at 817–21. 
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Hatch and Kennedy noted in a joint statement that RLUIPA “does not 
provide religious institutions with immunity from land use regula-
tion.”69 Furthermore, the “accepted zoning criteria” would allow judges 
to act in the place of Congress when striking a compromise with mu-
nicipalities in the application of RLUIPA to specific cases.70 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite this attempt at compromise and balance, the “accepted 
zoning criteria” test also raises the difficulty of equal application of the 
law in the context of exclusionary zoning.71 Judge Posner’s majority 
opinion outlined the merits of exclusionary zoning to set the stage for 
applying the equal terms provision in light of Hazel Crest’s commercial 
objectives.72 He went on to explain that the village was merely exclud-
ing noncommercial land uses from an area suitable for commercial us-
es.73 Thus, Judge Posner assumed the legitimacy of setting aside land 
for commercial use to the exclusion of other uses.74 
 Judge Sykes, in her dissent, questioned the legitimacy of exclu-
sionary zoning as understood in the application of RLUIPA.75 She not-
ed that the equal terms provision reflects a congressional judgment 
that local land-use regulations that treat religious institutions worse 
than other institutions are inherently not neutral.76 Thus, in her view, 
the majority’s emphasis on exclusionary zoning is inconsistent with 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.77 
III. Equality and Exclusionary Zoning 
 Despite the Seventh Circuit’s best efforts in River of Life to balance 
the various approaches to the equal terms provision, a system of exclu-
sionary zoning is incompatible with the goal of equal treatment under 
a zoning ordinance.78 The Third and Eleventh Circuits were both cor-
rect to identify the unequal amount of control exerted by either reli-
 
69 146 Cong. Rec. 16,700. 
70 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
71 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
72 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371–73. 
73 Id. at 373–74. 
74 See id. at 371–74. 
75 Id. at 388–89 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 388–89 
(7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting). There are also other reasons to question the legiti-
macy of exclusionary zoning. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 
1047, 1083–1108 (1996) (arguing that certain exclusionary zoning practices contribute to 
fragmented and isolated communities). 
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gious institutions or municipalities under each test—no matter which 
interpretation is used, either religious institutions or municipalities 
would end up with more power over land-use regulations.79 
 The Seventh Circuit’s new “accepted zoning criteria” test shifts con-
trol over land-use regulations out of the hands of religious institutions 
and into those of the courts and municipalities.80 That test gives courts 
more control over land-use regulation by integrating the practice of 
“imaginative reconstruction” in the application of the equal terms provi-
sion.81 
 As a result, the new test may decrease the number of cases brought 
under RLUIPA.82 Furthermore, the “accepted zoning criteria” test does 
not solve the problem of local officials couching their discriminatory 
zoning ordinances in general terms.83 In fact, as Judge Sykes noted in 
her dissent, municipalities are now free to discriminate against religious 
institutions in commercial areas because religious institutions do not 
advance commercial interests.84 In addition, the burden of identifying 
an accepted zoning criterion, which could be a mask for discriminatory 
zoning regulations, would discourage religious institutions from bring-
ing the suit in the first place.85 
 Finally, River of Life implicitly tips the balance in favor of local mu-
nicipalities in the Seventh Circuit by acknowledging their right to pri-
oritize certain parcels of land for commercial use.86 Judge Posner wrote 
that “[c]ommerce and industry must be recognized for what they are: 
necessary and desirable elements of the community.”87 Despite Judge 
Posner’s attempt to carve out a compromise, the “accepted zoning cri-
                                                                                                                      
79 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 
(3d Cir. 2007); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 n.14 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
80 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
81 See id.; Posner, supra note 67, at 817–21. Or, the new test does not meaningfully af-
fect the power of local zoning officials to provide self-serving regulatory criteria as justifica-
tions for certain zoning ordinances. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 376–77 (Williams, J., concur-
ring). 
82 See Edward W. McClenathan, Swinging the Big Stick: How the Circuits Have Interpreted 
RLUIPA and What Practitioners Need to Know, 36 Real Est. L.J. 405, 425 (2008). 
83 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 386 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371–73 (majority opinion). 
87 Id. at 372 (citing Harry B. Madsen, Noncumulative Zoning in Illinois, 37 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 108, 113–14 (1960)). 
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teria” test may deter religious institutions from suing under RLUIPA’s 
equal terms provision.88 
 Although one need not fault the court for favoring municipal gov-
ernments, the decision in River of Life raises the question whether there 
is a normative difference between religious and secular land uses.89 It 
also raises the difficulty of applying RLUIPA’s equal terms provision 
within the context of exclusionary zoning.90 
Conclusion 
 The decision in River of Life reflects the challenge of applying the 
concept of land-use equality in the context of exclusionary zoning. This 
difficulty is a cue to scholars and jurists to reconsider the practical ap-
plication of RLUIPA within the context of exclusionary zoning. For the 
time being, the application of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision exposes 
the incompatibility of equal treatment of the law with exclusionary zon-
ing practices. 
Tokufumi J. Noda 
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88 See id. at 371–73. Nevertheless, Judge Posner seems to leave the door open for suc-
cessful claims under the equal terms provision by stating that “should a municipality create 
what purports to be a pure commercial district and then allow other uses, a church would 
have an easy victory if the municipality kept it out.” Id. at 374. 
89 Adam J. MacLeod, A Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting RLUIPA Where Religious Land Uses 
and Community Interests Meet, 42 Urb. Law. 41, 73–76 (2010). This comparison itself, how-
ever, runs into the same problem of comparing incommensurable social goods. Id. at 75–
76. For example, because religion and health benefit society in different ways, perhaps 
both are equally important. Id. 
90 See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
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